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ABSTRACT
The use of differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) in an
aircraft landing system at high latitudes has been investigated.
Both the effects of the high latitude on geometry and accuracy and
the effects of scintillations on availability have been studied.
Data was taken at McMurdo and South Pole station, Antarctica over
a two year period. It was found that commercially available
systems should meet the FAA requirements for Special Category I
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HIGH LATITUDE ASPECTS OF A
DIFFERENTIAL GPS AIRCRAFT LANDING SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
The aircraft landing system at the US bases in Antarctica must
be replaced in the next few years. Differential Global Positioning
System (DGPS) navigation has been identified as a prime candidate
for this function. This choice is based on technical and
operational aspects of such a system. In addition during the last
year, the US Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) has investigated the use
of DGPS for the category I landing function and has had a
specification [1] prepared for special use airfields. The FAA is
also moving forward on the use of DGPS for public carriers. This
interest ensures that multiple vendors will have equipment for DGPS
aircraft landing systems available when needed for the Antarctic
application.
There are however several unique features to operations in
Antarctica. It was felt that these should be investigated to
determine if they were a problem and if so what remedial measures
would be necessary. There are two problems that needed to be
investigated:
1. accuracy problems due to unique station satellite
geometry at high latitudes,
2. potential signal outages due scintillation in high
latitudes.
It was the purpose of this study to investigate these two items and
acquire the data necessary to adequately specify a system that will
function in Antarctica. In particular operations at McMurdo and
South Pole station need to be supported and were the focus of this
study
.
B. Method of Study
In order to address these two issues, the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) put together an experiment and fielded it to McMurdo
in January 1992. The equipment consisted of two GPS receivers and
a data logging computer. It simulated a DGPS system with one
receiver serving as a base station and the second as a remote. In
this study, data were acquired on the accuracy of a DGPS system at
the same time as the frequency of occurrence of scintillation
problems was measured.
During 1992 the US Geological Study (USGS) operated a similar
receiver at South Pole station. USGS provided those data to NPS in
order to address the scintillation problem at South Pole station.
A NPS computer and data logging program were used during 1993 to
collect similar scintillation data at the Pole as was done at
McMurdo during 1992 in a cooperative effort between USGS and NPS.
C. General Results
It was not expected that scintillations would be a problem in
Antarctica [2]. These effects scale with the carrier frequency to
the -3/2 power [3] and from comparison with 2 50 MHz data taken in
northern polar regions [4] it seemed unlikely that scintillation
would be a major cause of signal loss. This proved true at
McMurdo. However, there were a few scintillation problems at Pole
station. These problems were associated with very intense
geomagnetic storms.
If aircraft receivers are used that track 9 or more satellites
then the loss of lock on a few satellites should not be a major
problem. However the FAA standard [1] requires only a minimum of
6 tracking channels in an aircraft receiver. This is one issue
where the specification for an Antarctic system will have to exceed
those for use only in the US. It is expected that more than one
vendor will offer receivers with 9 or more channels.
The accuracy of the system provided no surprises. Because the
satellites are at a 55 deg inclination, they never come overhead in
Antarctica, which is at latitudes higher than 55 deg. The lack of
very high elevation angle satellites makes for a poorer
determination of altitude, the key quantity in an aircraft landing
system. However there are always many satellites visible, with the
average being about 7.5 in McMurdo and 8.5 at Pole. This somewhat
negates this problem.
A model was developed for the error in the differential GPS
system. This was a simple extension of the standard dilution of
precision model [5]. A scale constant was added to account for the
effects of multipath. The measured averages and detailed
probability distribution of the errors at McMurdo fit this model
very well. Based on this model, which has satellite geometry
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ground receiver noise, aircraft receiver noise, and the multipath
factor as inputs, current receivers can meet the accuracy part of
the FAA proposed specification [1] in Antarctica.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Global Position System and Differential Operations
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite based
navigation system operated by the US Department of Defense (DoD)
.
This system has several levels of accessibility. The lowest level
is available to the public and has been guaranteed to be maintained
at its nominal level for 15 years for the purpose of air traffic
navigation. This provides a real time position anywhere, anytime
at a 100 m horizontal and 150 m vertical, at a 95 % confidence
level.
In GPS navigation the user receives signals from 4 or more GPS
satellites at the same time. There are 24 satellites in very high
orbits that ensure that sufficient satellites are available above
the horizon at all times. Modern GPS receivers observe more than
the 4 satellites necessary for a minimal solution. This improves
the accuracy of the solution and allows for autonomous detection of
bad satellite signals. This is called Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM) . If 6 satellites are observed, in addition to
determining that something is wrong, the satellite in error can be
identified. The FAA proposed specification, called the MASP [1],
specifies a 6 channel receiver with RAIM.
While 100 to 150 m is adequate for en route navigation, it is
not accurate enough for a landing system. For example, Category I
landings require a total system error in the vertical of 9.6 m 95%
of the time ( 4.8m one standard deviation ) . This is the total
system error. For Category I landing systems, 4.3 m of the 4.8 m
is allocated to the sensor error. Fortunately there is a method
of achieving this with GPS.
Almost all of the errors in the solution are due to systematic
errors on the satellite signals. These errors vary slowly over
space and will be essentially identical for two receivers separated
up to several hundred km. Therefore one only has to deploy a
receiver to a fixed know location, measure the errors in real time,
and broadcast them to nearby operators. This is called
differential GPS (DGPS) . It is so useful that there has been a
standard for the broadcast of the corrections for over 5 years.
The US Coast Guard is implementing DGPS for ship navigation on all
US coast lines and the great lakes. This is also the technique that
the FAA is specifying for Category I landing systems [1].
A typical DGPS landing system is diagramed in Fig 1. Here
there are three GPS receivers. In a flight critical system there
must be monitoring to ensure the correctness ( Integrity ) of
signals. A primary ground reference system receives the GPS
signals and generates corrections. These are formatted and



















Typical Special Category I Landing
System Configuration
user also receives the GPS signals, which it corrects with the
reference signal. A second system, at a fixed known location
performs a similar function. Because its location is known it can
determine the error in the reference station corrections. If they
fall out of tolerance, it sends a message, via hardwired connection
to the reference station to set error flags for user aircraft. This
is called the integrity monitor.
The accuracy of GPS and DGPS system is typically spoken of in
terms of Dilution of Precision ( DOP ) values. In general it is
assumed that the error in a component is the product of the
measurement noise and the DOP. For altitude, or the vertical
component, this is the VDOP. In general there are enough satellites
at both stations to provide the MASP suggested VDOP of 4 all the
time. With a lower noise ground station VDOPs of 6 should be
usable. These are available in Antarctica most of the time even
with one or two satellites unavailable due to scintillations or
other problems.
One way to dramatically improve the vertical accuracy is to
have a pseudo satellite (pseudolite) at the station. This is a
stationary, low power transmitter that transmits a signal in the
same format as a GPS satellite. The main reason that vertical is
the least well determined coordinate is that all satellites are on
one side, above, the user. A pseudolite removes this asymmetry.
A study was done that showed that a pseudolite, even one on a hill
at McMurdo greatly improved the situation through a lowering of the
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VDOP. However, other parts of this study have shown that minimum
Category I standards can be met without this extra piece of
hardware. Pseudolites will not be considered further in this
study.
B. High Latitude Ionospheric Scintillations
Signals observed on or near the earth from satellites must go
through a region where there are significant free ions and
electrons. This is called the ionosphere and extends from about
100 km to 1000 km in altitude. It is important because the
electrons can modify the path of radio signals. This effect is
frequency dependent and falls off as one over the square of the
frequency. At HF ( 5 - 30 Mhz ) this can totally reflect signals
making long distance HF communications possible. GPS signals are
at 1575 Mhz are only slightly effected.
If there is turbulence in the electrons with spatial changes
on the order of a wavelength, significant scattering occurs. This
causes signals to vary in intensity and phase, a phenomena called
scintillation. This is a significant problem at VHF, but falls off
with frequency as the -3/2 power. At GPS frequencies it should
not be a significant problem in polar regions.
It should be noted that there are two regions that produce
ionospheric scintillations, the polar regions and the equatorial
regions [2]. The physical mechanisms are totally different and the
scintillations in the equatorial region can be more intense than
those in the polar region [2,6]. Therefore one must be careful
about general statements about "ionospheric scintillation" and
determine is the statements apply to both regions or only one.
The earth's magnetic field shields the earth from high energy
particle streams coming from the sun. It does this by deflecting
the particles into paths that follow field lines. This means that
the particles hit the upper atmosphere in the polar regions, where
these field line intersect the 100 - 400 km altitude they deposit
energy and cause turbulence. This is in an oval about 12 to 14 deg
from the pole. However this is the magnetic pole, which is offset
from the spin axis by about 12 deg. This circle is called the
auroral oval because it is where this interaction causes optical
emissions (aurora)
.
The structures that cause the scattering are highly aligned
with the earth's magnetic field in polar regions. Therefore the
scattering is most intense when the line of sight to the satellite
is near to the magnetic field lines at altitudes of about 300 km.
This condition is never met for GPS satellites at McMurdo which is
quite near the south magnetic pole. At South Pole station, which
is in the southern auroral oval the alignment is high, but not
close to parallel for GPS satellites.
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High latitude scintillations occur in the auroral oval and
over a slightly wider region. Polar scintillations and aurora are
both caused by solar emissions that vary significantly with the 11
year solar cycle. There are very few events during solar minimum
and more during solar maximum. The last maximum occurred in 1990-
91 and the next will occur in 2001-2002. The solar activity is
usually quantified by the monthly Zurich sun spot number (Rz) .
This is shown over the last decade in Fig 2 . The last maximum was
broader than usual and lower than some. Cycles tend to alternate
between small and large maximum intensity. The last one was in the
middle however.
Associated with these events are also variations in the
earth's magnetic field. These aren't large compared to the ambient
field, but can be easily measured. Therefore these events are
called geomagnetic storms. The perturbation in the magnetic field
is measured by several numbers. The planetary K-index (Kp) is a
logarithmic scale. Upon converting it to a linear scale it is
called Ap. Ap is plotted for the last decade in Fig 3. It has
clear isolated spikes, the geomagnetic storms. The highest
activity is during solar maximum, but isolated storms do occur
during low solar activity. There were two very intense or "great"
storms last cycle, one in 1989 and the other in 1986 during low
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seen as far south as Mexico.
The experiment was rapidly developed and deployed to the field
in order to catch as many magnetic storms as possible. It caught
the Ap peak in mid 1992 ( see Fig. 3 ) and the smaller peaks late
in the year. It therefore caught one intense storm, two moderate
storms, and no very intense storms.
14
III. DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENT
McMurdo 1992
In order to acquire data quickly, two geodetic GPS receivers,
Ashtech MD XII' s, were obtained from the Defense Mapping Agency and
software developed to analyze data on the fly. A system diagram is
shown in Fig. 4. This looks very much like the standard landing
system configuration without integrity monitoring. Because we are
not using real aircraft, integrity was not necessary. In addition
because we know where the sites are, errors can be measured.
The data logging computer accepts data from both receivers at
a 1 Hz rate. It examines these on the fly, and determines if any
satellite has changed status, ( is missing for example ) . It logs
all acquisitions and loss of signal. In addition it determines the
position error and several other quantities. Averages of these
quantities are computed over 5 minute windows and saved. For the
position error the error distribution is also accumulated and
saved.
An operational landing system will operate only on the signal
called the LI C/A ( course acquisition ) . This is the signal
available to the public and used by the USCG and the FAA. Even-
15




though the receivers used could and did track other signals, only
the values from the C/A signal was used in this study.
When the system was first deployed there were only 16
satellites in orbit. By the end of the year there were 19. This
caused an unanticipated problem. The data logger or the
communication line became overloaded and missed data when 9 or more
satellites were in track. This caused some data processing
problems as these bad data records were interpreted as missing and
some satellites had false loss of locks logged. This became
extensive late in the season. Therefore only data before day 2 00
1992 from McMurdo were used in analysis.
A second problem with the experiment was the location of the
antenna. A diagram of the roof of the building where the McMurdo
experiment was setup is shown in Fig 5. The locations of the GPS
antennas ( "1" and "2" in the diagram ) are surrounded by many
other antennas which served as multipath sources and in some
directions blocked low elevation signals. This did not invalidate
the data, but did point out the importance of having a good
multipath free site for a ground reference system.
Starting at day 45 and extending until 200 1992, 154 days of
data were acquired and used for analysis of accuracy and signal
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A VHF FM 138-156 MHz 25-30 Watts Vertical
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Figure 5
McMurdo Experiment Environment
GPS Antennas at Locations 1 and 2
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B. South Pole 1992
The USGS operated an Asthech P-XII receiver during 1992/3 at
the South Pole station. They made their achieved data from 1992
available to NPS. This allowed for comparison of data taken at the
same time at Pole and McMurdo. In addition it included three
significant geomagnetic storms.
This data was analyzed to determine loss of locks. It did not
have any data logging problems as it only recorded data at 3 sec
intervals. However this means that the granularity of the results
are in 3 sec steps. Because only one station was available, no
DGPS accuracy values could be determined. The real time absolute
positions had errors on the order of 100 m, as expected, and were
not useful in this high accuracy study.
The South Pole site was on the top of the Skylab tower. It
was felt to be fairly free of multipath objects. Though some
multipath was detected in the data.
C. South Pole 1993
A modified version of the computer program that logged data at
McMurdo during 1992 was run at Pole in 1993. It logged data at 30




The error distributions were essentially those predicted by a
covariance analysis using a 2 m system noise (1.4 m per receiver).
For example the probability distribution in the over 500,000 points
during the week beginning on day 124 1992 are shown in Fig 6. The
two lines in the peak are for latitude and longitude. The lower
curve is for height. As expected height is the worst coordinate
due to the absence of very high elevation satellites. In the next
figure (Fig. 7) is shown the prediction using the almanac for day
120 1992 using a system noise value of 2 m. The plots in Fig.'s 7
and 8 are essentially indistinguishable. This close fit of the
measure error distributions to a simple model was true for all
weeks
.
The average noise needed to match the data was about three
times the value measured in a laboratory environment. The rms
error should be the product of the receiver noise and the DOP,
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Measured Differential GPS Position
Error Distribution at McMurdo
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Model Differential GPS Position
Error Distribution at McMurdo





is the differential system measurement noise,
o is the aircraft measurement noise,
o is the ground station measurement noise,
°v





According to simple theory [4] value of the vertical random error
is just the product of the VDOP and the system measurement noise.
Therefore the ratio,
Mt = -^- (3)
should be constant at 1. It will be large in the real world due




In the McMurdo experiment, the values of the VDOP and errors
in each axis were averaged in real time over 5 min windows and
recorded. The experimental ratio of average vertical error divided
by average VDOP is plotted against time of day for 6 days
beginning with day 131, 1992 in Fig 8. It is clear that this ratio
varies a lot, but in a pattern that repeats, slightly earlier each
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day. This is a signature for multipath. The geometry of the
satellites repeats every 23 hr 56 min. Therefore multipath should
repeat daily, only 4 min earlier each day. This is particularly
evident in the area between 3 and 6 hrs UT in Fig. 8. The average
value of this curve divided by the true oM ( about 0.5 m for these
receivers ) is the multipath value for this site.
Another important result is illustrated by this Fig. 8. The
most intense geomagnetic storm in our data sets occurred about 12
UT on day 131. This is not evident in this graph. The effects on
the accuracy of the storm were not significant at McMurdo.
The following simple model fits the data well. The altitude
error, averaged over a day, will be the product of the effective
system noise, the VDOP, and a multipath factor. This implies that
in high multipath environments the error distribution is normal
with an effective measurement noise of the real value times a scale
value. This is convenient for error analysis.
The Multipath factor must be at least 1, and will probably be
1.2 at lowest. For the McMurdo build 165 roof it was a horrible 3.
This points out the importance of site selection for the ground
station.
Today most older receivers have a receiver measurement noise
of 0.5 m. There is a newer "narrow correlator" family of receivers
24
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Figure 8
Multipath Factor For One Week at
McMurdo Showing 4 Min/Day Precision
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that have noise values of 0.1 to 0.2 m. Using these values one can
produce a table of expected vertical accuracy under various
conditions. This is shown in Table I. Here two noise values have
been used, a conservative 0.2 m for narrow correlator family, and
0.5 for the older generation. All combinations of airborne and
ground receiver noises are present. In addition multipath factors
of 1.2 (minimal in the real world), 2.0, and 3.0 (a high,
unacceptable value) are used. Finally two often used VDOP values,
4.0 and 6.0 are present.
With a multipath factor of 1.2, the FAA limit is met with all
but one combination of other factors. If only the ground station
has a narrow correlator receiver, then with a reasonable multipath
factor of 2.0 the system meets FAA specifications with VDOP of 4.
For a very clean ground antenna site it passes for VDOP of 6.
The FAA has introduced the concept of the "Tunnel". This is
a tunnel that is narrow at the decision height and wide at higher
altitude. In effect one can proceed down the tunnel to a height
where the predicted error exceeds the lower vertical boundary. For
the 6.5 m sensor error values in Table I this altitude is 400 ft.
This points up the importance of a clean reference antenna area.
26
Table I
Vertical Er ror Model Values
(1 Sigma
)
Grnd ° 7 Air °a */
Dv "v Meets
(m) (m) VDOP (m) FAA CAT
N.C. Grnd 0.2 0.2 1.2 4.0 1.4 *
N.C. Air 0.2 0.2 2.0 4.0 2.3 *
0.2 0.2 3.0 4.0 3.4 *
0.2 0.2 1.2 6.0 2.0 *
0.2 0.2 2.0 6.0 3.4 *
0.2 0.2 3.0 6.0 5.1
N.C. Grnd 0.2 0.5 1.2 4.0 2.6 *
S.C. Air 0.2 0.5 2.0 4.0 4.3 *
0.2 0.5 3.0 4.0 6.5
0.2 0.5 1.2 6.0 3.9 *
0.2 0.5 2.0 6.0 6.5
0.2 0.5 3.0 6.0 9.7
S.C. Grnd 0.5 0.5 1.2 4.0 3.4 *
S.C. Air 0.5 0.5 2.0 4.0 5.7
0.5 0.5 3.0 4.0 8.5
0.5 0.5 1.2 6.0 5.1





Sensor Erroi Limit 4.3







For this study days 4 5 to 200 from the McMurdo 1992 set were
used. This included one intense magnet storm at day 131.
Extending the set farther was difficult due to the increasing
occurrence of data logging errors. Most data logging errors were
identifiable because they shared the characteristics that: there
were a large number of satellites in track, several satellites went
away within 2 seconds, they stayed away 19-22 sec ( the system had
an error recycle feature ) , and they all came back together at once
with good tracking indicators immediately. It is felt, however,
that some data logging errors are still present in the data set.
In addition to the data logging problem, there are real loss
of locks at moderate elevation angles that occur every sidereal day
and line up with other antenna on the roof. These have been left
in the data set. Because no events not clearly due to the
experimental equipment have been removed, it is felt that the




The South Pole data was selected from archive tapes loaned to
NPS by USGS. Only 120 days were extracted and these contained 117
valid daily data sets. The selection was biased toward times of
geomagnetic storms. The intense storm around day 131 was extracted
as well as a later storm around day 280.
There were no apparent problems with the data sets and the
data were used as extracted with no editing.
B. Receiver Criteria
The raw measurements are of loss of locks during this
experiment. At the time the data was taken the full constellation
was not in place. Some method must be used to map these data into
receiver functionality in a real landing system in 1995 and beyond.
This mapping will depend on the number of channels that the
airborne receiver has. ( It is assumed that the ground station
will track all in view. )
Two receiver types are considered, a 6 channel receiver that
meets the minimum specifications in the MASP and a receiver with 9
or more channels, which will be called an "all in view" receiver
here. It will be assumed that any satellite lost would have been
29
in track by the airborne receiver. Therefore, any loss of a single
satellite will cause a 6 channel receiver to loose RAIM satellite
isolation ability. Two at once ( defined as within 30 sec of each
other ) will cause it to loose all RAIM capibilities and declare
itself non-functional.
For 9 channel or All in View receivers the loss of two
satellites will not necessarily cause a loss of functionality. A
study was performed using the final constellation and the McMurdo
and South Pole sites. This computed the DOP's from all
combinations of satellites in view. It then dropped satellites from
consideration that caused the worst effect on the VDOP. For Pole
the loss of the best two causes the VDOP to go above 6 only for 4
different periods of 5 min periods per day. At McMurdo it is
worse for the loss of the best 2 . It was decided not to define the
loss of two satellites with 30 sec of each other as a loss of
functionality for all in view receivers.
However if 3 satellites are lost, it will be assumed that some
very large event is in progress and the receiver would drop its
error flag. Therefore it was assumed that if three satellites had
a loss of lock above 10 deg, an all in view receiver was out of
specification.
It should be noted that these conditions will be automatically
recognized by airborne receiver meeting the FAA specification. An
30
error flag will drop if the geometry for the solution puts the
error outside the tunnel limits.
C. Raw Long Term Availability Values
The percent of time that a given receiver type was unavailable
on a daily basis and over the entire data sets were calculated.
These values can be compared to the MASP specification of 98 %
availability on a long term basis and continuity of 10" 4 . However
these are values intended for hardware error problems. In this
case the effects are outside the receiver. In addition the effects
are not randomly distributed. They are dominated by solar
eruptions that intersect the earth as indicated by geomagnetic
storms. It's a lot like the unavailability of DFW airport in the
summer due to a line of thunder storms. In both cases it's not
equipment related and there is some warning.
With that disclaimer, the raw daily values of unavailability
for McMurdo using an all in view receiver are shown in Fig 9. The
dominate event, on day 162, does not correspond to any magnetic
activity. Over 5 minutes all satellites, in all parts of the sky
are lost and come back. The event is unlikely to be ionospheric
scintillations and is likely an equipment problem. However it was
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The 6 channel receiver unavailability for McMurdo is given in
Fig. 10. This is presented for completeness but is likely filled
with un-detected data logger problems.
Both the 6 channel and all in view receiver data for South
Pole are presented on Fig. 11. Here there is no known data problem
and the events seem related to magnetic activity. It is felt that
these events are real and that Pole has a genuine scintillation
problem, although one that is not serious for a GPS landing system.
The raw long term unavailability probabilities are:
McMurdo South Pole
3 a «, i n-A6 Channels 3 x 10° 4 x 10
All in View 7 x 10" 5 5 x 10" 5
D. Geomagnetic Storm Day 131 1992 (May 10)
It is instructive to examine the data at both sites during the
most intense magnetic storm captured. The geomagnetic index Ap is
available for each 3 hour period. This three hour Ap is plotted
against time in Fig 12 for 5 days beginning at day 130. 1992.
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Figure 12
Magnetic Activity During Major
Storm, May 1992
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There is a peak of over 3 00 about noon, UT on day 131.
The loss of locks at McMurdo are plotted in Fig 13. Here the
vertical axis is the elevation angle of the loss of lock. Several
features can be seen on this figure. First there is an intense set
of loss of locks that occurs just at the peak of the storm.
Clearly the storm has an effect. Second there are a few losses at
about 4 5 deg that appear to be repeating a day later. These are
probably local multipath off items on the roof of building 165.
Finally the missing data is due to the data logger being off line
a that time.
A detailed examination of the data reveals only 3 real events
of two satellites out within 30 sec of each other. The two
satellite outages lasted from 20 - 60 s. There were no losses of
3 or more satellites at once.
A similar plot for the South Pole data is shown in Fig 14.
While it looks similar to the McMurdo data, there are several
events where the symbols are so close they do not show as distinct
events.
The valid events cover a period of 1.5 hours in two sections.
There is an intense period of 20 minutes when there is one loss of
3 satellites for 90 s and 5 losses of two satellites. After one
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Storm
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hour of good tracking there are 2 events where 2 satellites are
lost over 5 minutes. Even an all in view receiver might drop its
error flag a few times during the intense 2 minute period.
It should be noted that there were no 3 satellite loss events
during a later more moderate storm at South Pole station. The
intensity of the magnetic storm must be on the order of an Ap of
250 to cause these events.
E. Realistic Assessment of Unavailability
The most valid statements about availability may be that:
During intense storms with Ap greater than 250 South Pole
station will likely experience one or two periods of
unavailability for an all-in-view receiver with durations
about one to two minutes. For 6 channel receivers events
over extended times of 3 min are to be expected.
During intense storms at McMurdo all-in-view receivers
will likely have no loss of availability, but 6 channel
receivers will have a small number of periods lasting 1
to 2 minutes of unavailability.
No very intense storms were captured in the data set. An
40
educated estimate is that South Pole will have one to two
periods of 30 min of all in view outages and severe
problems for 6 channel receivers.
The problem now comes down to the occurrences of geomagnetic
storms of various intensities. During the two peak solar activity
years of a solar cycle there are 5 to 10 very intense storms per
year. There are one to two extremely intense storms per solar
cycle of 11 years.
Ignoring "great" storms, during solar maximum there would be
about 10 outages of 2 min at Pole per year. Less than half this
rate would occur at McMurdo. This is for all in view receivers.
"Great" storms are predictable about 36 hours in advance from
a lot of other prompt events associated with them ( X-rays etc. )
.
In fact the biggest problem is a false alarm rate. It's hard to
predict if the ejecta from the sun will hit the earth.
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VI . RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the data collected from McMurdo and South Pole the
following are recommended with respect to accuracy and
scintillation effects using GPS for a landing system in Antarctica:
1. Proceed with GPS Landing Systems,
2. Ground Stations Should Have Narrow Correlator or
Equivalent Low Noise Receivers,
3. The Location For the Ground Site Antenna Should Be Very
Clean of Multipath Objects,
4. Aircraft Receivers Should Have 9 Or More Channels
5. Aircraft Receivers Should Have Narrow Correlator
Receivers Where Practicable
6. Pseudolites Are Not Required If The Ground Site Is Clean
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